On Watching Movies and the Aesthetic Conditions Needed for it to Be Good

A truly aesthetic experience of film does not begin with the question of whether a movie is “great.” It begins earlier, in the conditions under which a viewer encounters it. What I mean is not a ranking of films, nor a canon, nor even a theory of cinematic excellence in the abstract. I mean something more modest and, at the same time, more intimate: the circumstances under which a person becomes capable of making an aesthetic judgment about a moving picture at all.

I’m speaking here from within my own experience, bracketed and phenomenological. I know perfectly well that others will name different conditions for their own deepest encounters with film. Still, my claim is that certain conditions do not merely describe my preferences; they help make possible the experience of film as an object of aesthetic judgment. They dispose the viewer toward the sort of attention from which beauty, sublimity, originality, and formal power can actually be felt.

The first condition is simple, almost embarrassingly simple: a film must be watched without interruption. If one wants to have a genuinely aesthetic experience, one cannot be half-watching. One cannot be texting, checking email, folding laundry, and grazing across six tabs of consciousness while the movie flickers in the background. A film demands duration, and duration demands surrender. To watch a movie aesthetically is to submit, for a time, to its order of images, sounds, rhythms, and silences. It is to grant the work one’s undivided attention.

This is not a moral condemnation of distracted viewing. I have watched plenty of movies merely to unwind, to numb out, to let the mind dissolve into pleasant noise. There is nothing wrong with that. Brain rot has its place. But that is not the same thing as aesthetic experience. The point is not that every instance of film consumption must rise to the level of contemplation. The point is that if one wants to be able to say, with seriousness, “that was beautiful,” or “that was formally astonishing,” then one must cultivate the habits that make such judgment possible.

In that sense, aesthetic judgment resembles any other human capacity. If I wanted to become better at mathematics, I would accept that certain disciplines are required of me. The same is true here. To refine one’s ability to judge film aesthetically, one must learn how to watch. One must build conditions favorable to encounter.

This is why the setting of viewing matters, even if it is not absolutely determinative. A cinema is ideal not because it automatically confers importance on the work, but because it enforces concentration. The darkness, the scale, the social silence, the inability to pause or drift away—all of this protects the film from casual fragmentation. But a theater is not the only place such attention can happen. One can create it at home, in a viewing room, even in front of a laptop, if one deliberately consecrates the event: I am going to watch this film now, and for the next two hours I belong to it.

A second condition follows from the first: the less prefabricated context, the better. The strongest first aesthetic judgments often arise when one encounters a film with minimal prior explanation. Ideally, I want to know as little as possible. I do not want to be told in advance what the film “means,” why it is historically significant, how it should be interpreted, or where the emotional peaks are supposed to land. I want the work to arrive before its reputation does.

Of course, this ideal is harder and harder to achieve. Modern spectators rarely meet artworks innocently. We live among previews, discourse, canon formation, fan edits, rankings, memes, critical consensus, and algorithmic recommendation. The image often reaches us before the work does. This is true of film, but it is also true of painting. When I stand before the Mona Lisa at the Louvre, I am not encountering a virgin object. I am confronting a work whose image has already been multiplied, miniaturized, ironized, commercialized, and absorbed into mass culture. Part of what I see is not the painting itself, but the sediment of its fame. In that sense, some artworks become artifacts of their own circulation.

That does not destroy aesthetic experience, but it does complicate it. There is a difference between discovering a work and arriving at a monument. The first is an event of perception; the second is often an event of recognition.

For film, then, one important condition of aesthetic experience is the possibility of surprise. Preferably, one sees the work before the chatter closes around it.

A third condition is originality—not in the cheap sense of novelty for novelty’s sake, but in the deeper sense of voice. A film must feel as though someone is speaking through it. It must not seem merely assembled from the dead remains of other films, other franchises, other market-tested gestures. Derivativeness deadens perception because it replaces discovery with recollection. One no longer encounters form; one merely recognizes content.

This is why sequels so often fail aesthetically, even when they succeed commercially. Their problem is not that they continue a story. Their problem is that they frequently inherit too much of the imaginative burden from the previous work. Adaptations are a more complicated case. An adaptation can be great precisely because it translates, transforms, and risks. It can discover a new voice inside an old structure. But it must still sound like someone meant it. The criterion is not whether the material is borrowed; the criterion is whether the film has achieved necessity of expression.

What matters, in other words, is that the film not feel secondhand.

Another condition, and one I find increasingly important, is the film’s relation to setting. Cinema is uniquely gifted in its capacity to render place. Because it is visual, because it unfolds in time, because it can linger, return, and accumulate, film can make a setting feel inhabited rather than merely depicted. A powerful film gives us not just a backdrop but a world with texture, weather, light, routine, social atmosphere. It lets a place become legible.

This is one reason Martin Scorsese’s Casino is such a useful example. It is not merely a crime film set in Las Vegas; Las Vegas becomes one of the film’s structuring presences, almost a character in its own right. The city’s spectacle, greed, brightness, and decay are not decorative—they are part of the narrative intelligence of the film. Casino was directed by Martin Scorsese and stars Robert De Niro, Sharon Stone, and Joe Pesci. 

By contrast, a film like Un Chien Andalou works through radically different means. Luis Buñuel’s 1929 short, co-written with Salvador Dalí, famously rejects conventional plot in favor of dream logic, disjunctive imagery, and startling associations. Its power is not narrative immersion but the assaultive coherence of the unconscious.  The point is not that one of these is superior to the other. It is that aesthetic experience can arise in both cases when the viewer consents to the formal logic proper to each work—narrative, in one case; surreal juxtaposition, in the other.

So perhaps the condition here is not “story” but intelligible form. A film must establish the terms on which it wishes to be seen, and the viewer must grant those terms a chance.

Finally, there is the human figure. Film possesses a special intimacy with faces, gestures, pauses, glances, and bodily presence. Even the most expansive cinema often turns, at decisive moments, on something minute: a hesitation before speech, the way a hand rests on a doorframe, a face registering knowledge too quickly to become language. One of the privileges of film is that it allows us to see people under the pressure of time. A good film does not simply tell us who someone is; it lets us witness becoming, concealment, revelation, and breakdown. That is one of the deepest sources of aesthetic experience in cinema: the transformation of the human face into an event of meaning.

If I had to state the argument plainly, then it would be this: a truly aesthetic experience of film requires attention, openness, and the possibility of surprise. It is deepened by uninterrupted viewing, by a setting that protects concentration, by minimal prefabricated context, by originality of voice, by a rich sense of place, and by the film’s ability to render human presence with force and specificity. These conditions do not guarantee that a film will be beautiful. But they make beauty more available to perception.

The issue, then, is not only what makes a film great. The issue is what makes us ready to encounter greatness—or beauty, or strangeness, or formal power—when it appears. Aesthetic judgment is not just a verdict we pronounce after the fact. It is a capacity we prepare in ourselves beforehand.

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